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Abstract Governance of health and genomic data access in the context of biobank-
ing is of salient importance in implementing the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). Various components of data access governance could be con-
sidered as ‘organizational measures’ which are stressed in the Article 89(1) GDPR 
together with technical measures that should be used in order to safeguard rights of 
the data subjects when processing data under research exemption rules. In this chap-
ter, we address the core elements regarding governance of biobanks in the view of 
GDPR, including conditions for processing personal data, data access models, over-
sight bodies and data access agreements. We conclude by highlighting the impor-
tance of guidelines and policy documents in helping the biobanks in improving the 
data access governance. In addition, we stress that it is important to ensure the exist-
ing and emerging oversight bodies are equipped with adequate expertise regarding 
using and sharing health and genomic data and are aware of the associated informa-
tional risks.
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Governance of health and genomic data access in the context of biobanking is of 
salient importance in implementing the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). Various components of data access governance could be considered as 
‘organizational measures’ which are stressed in the Article 89(1) GDPR together 
with technical measures that should be used in order to safeguard rights of the data 
subjects when processing data under research exemption rules. By establishing ade-
quate governance mechanisms from the outset in the process of personal data pro-
cessing, the ultimate goal of the regulation in terms of ‘privacy by design’ will be 
facilitated, in which data protection safeguards will be built into the products and 
services from the earliest stage of development.
According to the GDPR Article 9(2)(j), personal data, including sensitive data, 
could be processed for scientific research purposes under the conditions set out in 
the Article 89. As Article 9(2)(j) states: ‘processing is necessary for archiving pur-
poses in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law 
which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to 
data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fun-
damental rights and the interests of the data subject.’
In principle, adopting adequate governance models that are foreseen by the 
GDPR will establish additional controls, to protect the rights of the data subjects 
when processing personal data for research purposes. A similar approach has been 
supported by a report on the Collection, linking and use of data in biomedical 
research and health care by Nuffield Council on Bioethics, which noted, ‘Because 
of the risk of misuse and consequential privacy infringement, de-identification and 
consent measures may be supplemented by further governance arrangements.’1
One key element in biobank governance is developing transparent and fair data 
access rules, which should address the core elements regarding data access review 
and oversight procedures. Generally speaking, rules for data access should delineate 
criteria for data user’s qualification, the review procedure, and terms and conditions 
of access. The ultimate goal is to decrease the risks of harms to the research partici-
pants that may arise from unauthorized access to the datasets for unintended pur-
poses. In principle, the development of the data sharing and access rules must be in 
compliance with the applicable national laws. The relevant international and 
national data sharing policies and guidelines that are issued by various professional 
communities may guide the development of data access rules.
Moreover, data access rules should be developed in the view of suitable data 
access models, which could range from fully open-access to controlled-access. The 
nature of the data in terms of identifiability and the associated privacy risks for the 
data subjects significantly influences the model of data access. It should be noted 
that biobanks and data-intensive genomics and health studies might use external 
1 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2014), p. 7.
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data repositories for data sharing such as the NIH database of Genotypes and 
Phenotypes (dbGaP) or the European Genome-phenome Archive (EGA).2 This 
could be requested by funding organizations or journals in order to facilitate broad 
access to the data. In case of using external databases, it is essential for the research-
ers to ensure that the data governance models of the databases conform with the 
applicable national laws and institutional policies.3
In this chapter, we address a number of issues essential in discussion regarding 
governance of biobanks in the view of GDPR. First, we will investigate the GDPR’s 
relevant provisions regarding processing personal data under research exemption. 
This is particularly pertinent for the governance of biobanks, as personal data har-
vested from biological samples may include a wide range of health and genomic 
data. Second, we will provide an overview of the major data access models, namely 
open access, registered access and controlled access. This overview will enable us 
to show the level of control that biobanks could maintain on data based on the 
selected model of data access. Finally, we will review the functions of the relevant 
oversight committees in the framework of governance of data access. Some of these 
oversight committees, such as Data Access Committees are not defined by the 
GDPR, yet they are essential in the governance of data access in biobanks. We will 
also refer to data transfer agreements as an important tool used in the governance of 
data access.
2  Processing Personal Data for Scientific Research Purposes
The GDPR provides a certain degree of flexibility for the processing of personal 
data for scientific research purposes. Notably, the GDPR upholds a ‘research exemp-
tion’ to the general prohibition otherwise imposed on the processing of ‘special 
categories of data’4 (a label under which are grouped sensitive data like genetic, 
biometric and health-related data that are recognized as warranting the implementa-
tion of higher forms of protection from the part of data controllers.5) In addition, 
Article 6 recognizes processing personal data for public interest or legitimate inter-
est in the list of lawful grounds for processing data. When read in conjunction with 
Art. 9(2)(j), this can, in turn, provide a legal basis for processing data for scientific 
research purposes. The so-called research exemption allows the processing of data 
for scientific research purposes, where the processing is proportionate to the aim 
pursued, that is, only personal data which is adequate and relevant for the purposes 
of the processing is collected and processed.
2 Paltoo et al. (2014), pp. 692–695.
3 Mascalzoni et al. (2019).
4 Article 9(2)(j), GDPR.
5 Recital 53, GDPR.
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Additionally, the Regulation6 relaxes the stringent requirements for specific con-
sent and data storage—two key aspects directly impinging on biobanking—, allow-
ing use of broad consent whenever required by the intended research purposes,7 and 
to extend the period in which personal data can be legally stored.8,9
Crucially, subject to the provision of technical and organizational safeguards, the 
GDPR further allows Member States to introduce derogations from the core data 
subject rights of data access, rectification, restriction of processing, and object to the 
processing,10 whenever upholding such rights is ‘likely to render impossible or seri-
ously impair’ the achievement of the desired scientific research purposes, and such 
derogations are deemed essential for the fulfilment of these purposes.11 More in 
general, in line with the principle of subsidiarity and the (historically) national com-
petence in the field of health, Article 9(4) of the Regulation allows Member States 
to maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with regard to the 
processing of genetic, biometric and health-related data. On a par with the deroga-
tions foreseen under Article 89(2) that are further elaborated in this volume by 
Anne-Marie Duguet and Jean Heveg, this could potentially lead to the fragmenta-
tion of the regulatory landscape underpinning the operations of European biobanks.12
3  Pseudonymized and Anonymized Data
3.1  Introductory Remarks
In order to identify the adequate organizational and technical measures in accessing 
and sharing genomic and health data in the context of biobanks, it is crucial to inves-
tigate the status of data, and whether the data is being considered as personal data 
under the GDPR. A relevant distinction enshrined in the GDPR, with significant 
implications for the processing and governance of access to sensitive data in the 
field of biobanking, is the one between pseudonymized and anonymized data.
6 Recital 33, GDPR.
7 Article 29 Working Group Party (2018).
8 Article 5(1)(e), GDPR.
9 Marelli and Testa (2018), pp. 496–498.
10 Article 15, 16, 18 and 21, GDPR.
11 Article 89(2), GDPR. LERU (2016).
12 For insights in how Article 89(2) has been implemented in different EU Member States and EEA 
states, see Tzortzatou et al. ‘Biobanking across Europe post-GDPR: A deliberately created frag-
mented landscape’ in this volume.
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3.2  Pseudonymized Data
Pseudonymized data are defined, in Article 4(5), as data that ‘can no longer be 
attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, pro-
vided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical 
and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an 
identified or identifiable natural person’. This is typically the case of key-coded 
data, which allows (among other things) the traceability and correlation of geno-
typic and phenotypic data, as well as the possibility to recontact research partici-
pants, while still preserving the de-identification of personal data in the day-to-day 
operations of the organization. Accordingly, insofar as they are not irreversibly de- 
identified, pseudonymized data are considered as personal data, falling under the 
scope of the GDPR.
On the contrary, according to Recital 26, irreversible de-identification is defined 
as ‘information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person’ 
or as ‘personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is 
not or no longer identifiable’. As further specified in Recital 26, anonymized data 
fall outside the remit of the GDPR. However, it should be noted that the act of ano-
nymization itself should be considered as an act of processing personal data, which 
should occur, accordingly, in compliance with the GDPR.
3.3  Anonymization of Data
When we focus on anonymization, the main question to be addressed is: Under what 
circumstances, if any, can genomic and health data be anonymous in light of the 
GDPR?13 Interestingly, the GDPR differs conspicuously, in this respect, from other 
major data protection legislations, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule in the US.14 Within the Privacy Rule, the 
Safe Harbor standard for achieving the de-identification of personal data singles out 
18 distinct identifiers, the removal of which is said to make the resulting informa-
tion ‘not individually identifiable’, and thus anonymous.15
Differently from this approach, recital 26 of the GDPR states instead that per-
sonal data should be considered anonymous insofar as the data subject cannot be 
identified ‘by any means reasonably likely to be used [...] either by the controller or 
by any other person’.16 To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used 
to identify the natural person, the GDPR further states that ‘account should be taken 
13 For a broader overview of this issue in relation to genomic data, cf. Shabani and Marelli (2019).
14 Shabani et al. (2018).
15 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (2012), p. 6.
16 Recital 26, GDPR; see also: Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Case C-582/14: 
Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
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of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for 
identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the 
processing and technological developments’ (Recital 26). In addition, opinion 
05/2014 of the Article 29 Working Party has outlined other factors that should be 
taken into consideration, such as the existence of publicly available data which can 
be cross-referenced with the original dataset, thus heightening the risk of de- 
anonymization. As such, and in line with the overall decentralized thrust of the 
Regulation, the GDPR can be said to adopt a context-base criterion to determine 
whether personal data should be considered as irreversibly de-identified (and thus 
anonymous), bestowing upon controllers the responsibility to address such a ques-
tion (is there a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that re-identification techniques can be effec-
tively used to de-anonymize my given dataset?) in the context of their concrete 
processing activities.
4  Governance Models for Accessing Genomic 
and Health Data
4.1  Governance Models: An Overview
Samples and data collected by biobanks can be accessed for various research pur-
poses. Such access may not be limited only to the researchers/clinicians who col-
lected the data, but also a broader range of researchers. Adopting adequate 
governance models would assist to protect data subjects against potential privacy 
breaches. The current governance model can be grouped under three major models 
of open access, controlled-access and registered access, which are explained below.
4.2  Open-Access
Open-access models generally refer to making data available for the users through 
various online platforms without any constraint. Sharing data through open-access 
models has been initially pursued by the Human Genome Project, which sequenced 
the whole human genome for a first time in the course of 13 years.17 However, the 
concerns related to identifiability of genomic data that has been demonstrated by a 
number of re-identification studies, questioned the adequacy of adopting such 
model when sharing health and genomic data.18 Consequently, genomic data have 
17 Cook-Deegan and McGuire (2017), pp. 897–901.
18 Homer et al. (2008), pp. 321–324.
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been moved to the controlled-access databases.19 This has been mainly the case 
when sharing personal level information rather than aggregate data.
A key question here is when genomic data could be considered as non- identifiable 
under GDPR, therefore suitable for sharing through open-access models? The regu-
lation states that the principles of data protection ‘should not apply to anonymous 
information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifi-
able natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that 
the data subject is not or no longer identifiable’ (Recital 26). 
As it has been shown in the previous part, GDPR adopts a context-based criterion 
to determine whether personal data should be considered as irreversibly de- identified 
(and thus anonymous) and do not define the standards for de-identification itself. 
Hence, it is important, to decide when data can be considered as anonymous and do 
not fall under GDPR protection. Thereby, this is the responsibility of the data con-
trollers to confirm whether the data is not identifiable by reasonable likelihood. For 
example, in the context of genomics, only sharing variant-level aggregate data may 
not be considered as identifying personal data, therefore adopting open-access 
model for sharing such data would seem acceptable under the GDPR. In a same 
vein, recently National Institutes of Health (NIH) updated its Genomic Data Sharing 
Policy and allowed unrestricted access to genomic summary results that do not raise 
privacy concerns.
4.3  Controlled-Access
In the view of privacy concerns when sharing health and genomic data, adopting a 
controlled-access model for data sharing is favored. Thereby, the data controllers 
can set rules for data access and limit access to the datasets to the approved users 
and under the determined terms and conditions. Such access control mechanisms 
can be considered as technical and organizational measures, which are mentioned in 
Article 89(1). Although there is no single model for controlled-access, a common 
approach is to establish oversight committees, or so-called Data Access Committees 
(DACs) to review the data access requests for the purpose of approval or disap-
proval. One of the important aspects of controlled-access data sharing is to use tools 
such as data access agreements (see Sect. 5), which are legally binding documents, 
in order to hold users accountable against potential misuses of data. This is in con-
trast with the open-access model where the users do not enter to any agreement with 
the data holders.
Oversight by DACs could be considered as an example of organizational mea-
sures that have been stressed in Article 89. Thereby, further safeguards could be 
offered to protect the privacy of the data subjects and ensure the downstream data 
19 Rodriguez et al. (2013), pp. 275–276.
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uses conform to the original consent forms.20 However, the recent studies have 
showed that the current oversight by DACs are not always efficient or effective.21 
One major reason for the identified shortcomings is DACs are not always 
equipped with sufficient tools and oversight mechanisms to effectively review 
the data access requests or detect the potential violations of data access 
agreements.
In response, novel approaches to data access oversight are being developed. In 
particular, it has been suggested to replace or supplement review by DACs by auto-
mated tools.22 In addition, not all steps of data access review are deemed to be nec-
essary for all types of health and genomic data sharing. In the next section, we will 
provide an overview of one of these recently suggested methods for data gover-
nance, namely the Registered Access model.
4.4  Registered Access
Registered access is likely to be suitable as a mechanism for access to data types 
that are less sensitive and low risk, such as non-stigmatizing health-related data 
from non-vulnerable individuals who would expect, or have consented to, data 
sharing for the purposes envisaged.23 This model would focus primarily on ensur-
ing that the data users are bona fide researchers. The rationale behind the regis-
tered model is that if processing data is not creating high risks of identifiability 
and the users are trusted, then further access review (for instance reviewing the 
ethical or scientific aspects of the proposals) would be redundant or 
disproportionate.
The ‘registered access’ model hinges on a number of core elements, namely 
authentication, authorization and attestation. First, the data use applicants should 
provide personal and professional information within a registration process, includ-
ing their name, title, position, affiliation, email address, institutional website and 
mailing address for the purpose of authentication. In contrast to a controlled-access 
model, a registered-access model would not entail verification on a case-by-case 
basis by a DAC of the users’ qualifications. In addition, the applicants should 
declare that they are ‘bona fide’ researchers in order to be authorized access. At last, 
the applicants should agree with the terms and conditions of the data access. Within 
the registered access model, data users would not need to sign a data access agree-
ment in a paper-based format but could instead agree via clickwrap-type online 
agreements. Indeed, the procedure for signing data access agreements by DACs, 
20 Shabani and Borry (2017), pp. 149–156.
21 Shabani and Borry (2016), pp. 892–897.
22 Woolley et al. (2018), p. 17.
23 Dyke et al. (2016), pp. 1676–1680.
M. Shabani et al.
53
and users and their home institution, is administratively heavy and this proposed 
alternative approach could reduce pressure on DACs and create rapid, open and 
efficient access to data.
A Registered-access model is only one proposed solution in response to the 
limitations of the controlled-access model. It is expected that novel governance 
models will emerge in the coming years in order to address the identified short-
comings of the controlled-access models, and in line with the principles of respon-
sible data sharing. In addition to emerging governance mechanisms, novel 
technical solutions are also proposed,24 including the introduction of federated 
networks in which multiple distributed databases are connected.25 By using feder-
ated networks, users would be able to have (a level of) access to data in a protected 
virtual environment, and each database would be able to monitor data uses in real 
time. To date, few models of federated data computation have been suggested.26 
Considering the limitations of controlled-access models, there is a pressing need 
for the introduction of such innovative solutions. Concurrently, it is important to 
ensure the core elements of secure data computational environments are in line 
with data protection principles.
5  Relevant Data Sharing and Access Oversight Bodies 
and Tools
5.1  Data Access Committees
The need to establish an extra layer of oversight through DACs is grounded in the 
nature of data sharing, which allows downstream data uses that are not known at the 
time of the initial sample and data collection. Therefore, research ethics committees 
cannot foresee all downstream data uses when they approve the research protocol in 
the beginning. In that sense DACs are considered as an extra layer of oversight next 
to research ethics committees, which review the proposals in the beginning of the 
studies. In particular, DACs are established to receive data access requests from 
actual users and assess them for the purpose of approving or disapproving their 
access to data.27 DACs are not mentioned in the GDPR, but their role in governance 
of data access is important. This can indeed be considered as part of research self- 
regulation in order to ensure data sharing and use is in line with the overarching 
principles and the relevant regulations.
24 Joly et al. (2016), pp. 1150–1154.
25 Philippakis et al. (2015), pp. 915–921.
26 Wallace et al. (2014), pp. 149–157. See also: Ardeshirdavani et al. (2014).
27 Lowrance (2012), p. 23.
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DACs, function in different ways. As Lowrance illustrates, ‘some of these groups 
are formally constituted, have terms of reference and hold regular meetings. Others, 
are casual, rarely meeting but existing to be consulted from time to time by the cus-
todian and in a position to address serious problems should any arise’.28
The composition of DACs varies across the institutions. Ideally, such committees 
should be consisting of internal and independent members with expertise in techni-
cal, ethical and legal aspects of processing health and genomic data. Some have 
suggested establishing two-layer committee is beneficial, namely an advisory com-
mittees together with operational access committees. The advisory committees will 
be tasked with auditing the performance of the operational access committees, 
while the operational committee will be responsible for reviewing the access 
requests.
Moreover, the oversight committees, such as DACs and Research Ethics 
Committees, should be given the opportunity to assess the data access rules on a 
regular basis, and propose revision of the provisions when needed. This could ulti-
mately strengthening effective operation of the organizational measures under 
Article 89(1). In addition, transparency of the data access governance could be con-
siderably enhanced if adequate information dissemination policies are adopted. It is 
expected that the oversight bodies within the institutions provide information about 
the access review procedure, incoming data access requests and approved and dis-
approved requests to enhance transparency and facilitate external scrutiny. 
Furthermore, data access governance models should adopt mechanisms that hold 
users accountable.
5.2  Data Protection Impact Assessment and Appointment 
of Data Protection Officers (DPOs)
The GDPR sets further requirements in terms of governance of data processing 
when higher risks for the freedoms and the rights of the data subjects are perceived. 
One of the relevant organizational measures foreseen by the GDPR is to appoint a 
data protection officer (DPO) and conduct data protection impact assessment when 
specific conditions are met. The biobanks as entities that process health and genomic 
data should adhere to these provisions.
The Regulation in Article 37 provides a set of rules for designating the DPO 
when the processing of personal data within institutions meets certain criteria. 
According to the explanation provided by the European Data Protection Supervisor: 
‘the main task of the data protection officer is to ensure, in an independent manner, 
the internal application of the provisions of the Regulation in his/her institution. 
The data protection officer is also required to keep a register of all of the process-
ing operations involving personal data carried out by the institution. The Register, 
28 Lowrance (2012), p. 23.
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which must contain information explaining the purpose and conditions of the pro-
cessing operations, should be accessible to any interested person.’29 The appoint-
ment of a DPO must of course be based on her personal and professional qualities, 
but particular attention must be paid to her expert knowledge of data protection.
In addition, according to Article 35, a privacy impact assessment is necessary: 
‘where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into 
account the nature, scope, context and purpose of the processing is likely to result 
in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior 
to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing 
operations on the protection of personal data.’ Therefore, a broad scope for these 
data protection impact assessments is expected, which goes beyond compliance 
with the Regulation and privacy rights and includes consideration of a plethora of 
individual’s fundamental rights. This will therefore provide an opportunity to take 
into account a broader range of concerns relating to the rights of individuals in pro-
cessing personal data and not only those that are related to storage and safety. Article 
35(b) adds that the data protection impact assessment shall in particular be required 
in cases where there is ‘processing on a large scale of special categories of data 
referred to in Article 9(1)’.
The controller shall receive a data protection officer’s advice (if he/she has been 
appointed) when carrying out a data protection impact assessment. Consequently, 
the data controller shall consult the supervisory authority prior to processing ‘where 
a data protection impact assessment under Article 35 indicates that the processing 
would result in high risk.’30 Article 35(9) also requires the data controller, where 
appropriate, to ‘seek views of data subjects or their representatives on the intended 
processing’.
The impact assessment will therefore replace the previous obligation to notify 
the data protection authority, which was outlined by the Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. This change 
was welcomed by commentators, who argued against the effectiveness of the previ-
ous notification requirement. As Townend argues: ‘Although data controllers are 
required to register their activity with the relevant supervisory authorities and that 
authority has power to investigate and prosecute breaches of the data subject’s 
rights, the sheer amount of processing that goes on within any jurisdiction at any 
given time makes it impossible for a supervisory authority to be seen as the primary 
protector in the system’.31 In turn, the new requirements will see a shift towards the 
accountability of the controllers and reinforce their role in establishing adequate 
safeguards in the course of the processing, not only limiting it to the outset of the 
project.32 This could also draw the attention of the data controllers towards the 
29 European Data Protection Supervisor. https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/
eu-institutions-dpo_en.
30 Article 36, GDPR.
31 Townend (2016), pp. 128–142.
32 de Hert and Papakonstantinou (2016), pp. 179–194.
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ethical concerns associated with data processing and take the concerns into account 
in the design of the processing.
5.3  Data Access Agreements and Data/Material 
Transfer Agreements
Contractual agreements are essential operational instruments intended to legally 
bind the parties to specific rules ensuring adequate individuals’ privacy protection 
throughout personal data processing. Such contracts can take many forms and be 
labelled differently such as ‘Data Access Agreements’ (DAAs), ‘Data Transfer 
Agreements’ (DTAs) or ‘Confidential Data Agreements’ (CDAs). Personal data 
protection measures are also included within other special research agreements, in 
particular within the so-called ‘material transfer agreements’ (MTAs) when biologi-
cal samples are also transferred. In particular, it is widely recommended to include 
in MTAs provisions regarding samples’ quality, transportation, conditions and 
restrictions of use (e.g. derivations of original material) and storage (biosafety/
biosecurity).
The nature and scope of the contract can vary depending on the internal practices 
of operators or applicable national legal framework, the requester’s processing 
operation and purposes, the database governance model (cf. supra) and on the cross- 
border features of the access (intra-EU or including outside-EU elements). For 
example, where data is managed within a closed controlled system (e.g. digital data 
analysis platform), an access agreement could take the form of terms and conditions 
in the view of the applicable regulations. In addition, a decentralized infrastructure 
could rely on a general Access policy having a contractual value. For example, 
BBMRI-ERIC33 provides such template while allowing its members to adopt spe-
cific and compliant contractual activities to frame collaborations.34
The legal qualification of the parties to such agreements is context-dependent 
and needs a case-by-case analysis of the role and activities of each stakeholder. 
Access could be requested in a framework of a research collaboration with the bio-
bank or by an external researcher to conduct an independent research project. 
Thereby, the contract will define a controller-processor relationship or a joint- 
controllers relationship. This is in line with the GDPR that requires setting up a 
contract for organizing joint-controllers35 and/or controller-processor relationships36 
in terms of duties and rights in processing data.
33 BBMRI-ERIC (2018).
34 B3Africa, Checklist: For a good governance of transcontinental collaborative biobank research. 
http://biobanklearning.iarc.fr/course/checklist-elsi/#llms-lesson-locked. Accessed 9 May 2019.
35 Article 26, GDPR.
36 Article 28, GDPR.
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The data access agreements usually include negotiable and non-negotiable pro-
visions. Contracts shall echo and respect the will of the initial donor and facilitate 
the exercise of the donors’ rights. The parties shall commit to respect confidentiality 
and plan cooperation procedures, in particular regarding personal data breach noti-
fications. The agreement must also clearly describe any restriction specified by the 
initial controller during the deposit of the data/sample in the biobank or imposed by 
the biobank policy based on a legitimate interest (e.g. regarding onward transfers 
possibilities, the return of the data/samples or destruction, intellectual property 
issues). For ensuring proper legal security, agreements must include information 
about the applicable laws and dispute resolution mechanisms, including out-of- 
court proceedings. Financial provisions could also be included but should not be 
indexed on the intrinsic personal data or sample value but on the necessary invest-
ments performed for ensuring samples or data quality, integrity and FAIRness for 
example.
In addition, the GDPR is setting specific conditions when transferring data/and 
samples to non-EU countries. Accordingly, materials can only be transferred to a 
third entity in a country that ensures an appropriate level of protection of individu-
als’ rights and freedoms compared to the one guaranteed within the EU. Therefore, 
such a transfer can be permitted where it is based on an adequacy decision adopted 
by the European Commission after analysis of a country general and sectorial 
legislation,37 or where appropriate safeguards are in place.38 This is including the 
use of binding corporate rules (applying to cross-border personal data transfers in a 
group of undertaking or a between entities of a multinational enterprise), or of stan-
dard contractual clauses adopted by the European Commission39 (provided that they 
are not modified, otherwise the competent supervisory authority should be con-
sulted to validate the adapted clauses), the respect of an approved Code of Conduct 
or the use of an approved certification mechanism together with binding and 
enforceable commitments of the controller or processor in the third country to apply 
the appropriate safeguards, including as regards data subjects’ rights.
In exceptional circumstances, in the absence of an adequacy decision and of 
appropriate safeguards a transfer shall take place only if one of the conditions of 
Article 49 GDPR are met. This includes situations where the data subject has explic-
itly consented to the transfer, after having been informed of the possible risks of 
such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and 
appropriate safeguards, or the transfer is necessary for protecting the vital interests 
of the data subject, or is necessary for important reasons of public interest recog-
nized in the Union or relevant Member State law (e.g. fight against cross-border 
public health threats), or is made from a public register intended to provide 
37 Article 45, GDPR.
38 Article 46, GDPR.
39 European Commission. Model contracts for the transfer of personal data to third countries. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/model-con-
tracts-transfer-personal-data-third-countries_en. Accessed 9 May 2019.
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information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in 
general or by any person who can demonstrate a legitimate interest.
6  Conclusions
In developing data access rules and governance models biobanks could be assisted 
by soft law measures, which have traditionally had considerable importance in the 
field. It seems that GDPR leaves considerable room to operationalize its provisions 
through these soft law measures. One area that soft law measure can be useful is in 
elaborating on what organizational measures should be when processing data under 
research exemptions. In particular, such measures can provide guidance on the ade-
quate models of data governance, oversight bodies, data access rules and implemen-
tation of data protection best practices.
Oversight bodies can be considered as a crucial part under organizational mea-
sures. In particular, oversight bodies such as ethics committees and data access 
committees are in the good place to hold control over the access and use of data. It 
is important to ensure the existing and emerging oversight bodies are equipped with 
adequate expertise regarding using and sharing genomic data and are aware of the 
associated informational risks. In order to achieve this, soliciting the attitudes of the 
involved parties regarding the associated risks would be necessary. Thereby, the 
overall governance of personal data processing will go beyond legal requirements 
and will take into account the pertinent individual or social concerns that may not 
be explicitly outlined in the legal provisions. That said, DACs often lack adequate 
tools to keep ongoing oversight on actual use of data once data access has been 
granted. Such limitations on the oversight on data access should be taken into con-
siderations, when assessing the potential risks and the adequacy of the current over-
sight tools and mechanisms.
Moreover, the oversight of personal data processing by competent authorities 
should keep pace with recent developments in the field of data science, bioinformat-
ics and genetics, among others. The risks associated with emerging technologies 
and the safeguards in protecting the privacy of data subjects should be treated as 
moving targets. Otherwise, the safeguards will become obsolete and unable to safe-
guard data subjects in an adequate fashion.
Finally, increasing cross-border data sharing underlines the importance of the 
harmonization of legal frameworks concerning personal data protection. One of the 
main goals of the Regulation has been to achieve this by harmonizing the personal 
data protection landscape across EU. However, concerns remain regarding the real 
impact of the Regulation on unifying the national regulations towards processing 
health and genetic data for research purposes, across Member States. Arguably, the 
Regulation still leaves room for varying interpretations, for instance, concerning the 
safeguards that should be established and also in setting further conditions for pro-
cessing data on the basis of the research exemption provisions. This may challenge 
development of European sample repositories and data sharing platforms, as 
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different safeguards may be required to be adopted for samples/data collected in 
different member states.
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